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Abstract. Argumentation plays an important role in reasoning and allows the
justification of opinions, especially when applied to collaborative decision making.
Reaching consensus is not a trivial task where arguments exchanged in a dialogue
and common knowledge are important for consensus. This paper presents a model of
argumentative dialogue to support the formation of common knowledge in a group
of agents that communicate by sending arguments, and proposes a semantics for
consensus decision making. The output of the model is a weighted argumentation
graph in which semantics is used to decide the preference of the group.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Reaching consensus about an issue through discussion with a group of people is
not a trivial task [15, 24]. When applied to a group of intelligent agents, this
task becomes even more complex, since agents must reason about logically related
instructions [1]. In order for consensus decision making in a group to take place,
it is necessary to identify the consensus level (or level of acceptance) of the group
with regard to the available decision alternatives. The stronger the justifications
for supporting or rejecting a particular decision alternative, and the greater the
consensus of the group on these justifications, the closer the situation will be to
a decision by consensus [25]. The choice of a decision alternative by consensus does
not reflect the optimal decision, but rather the one that is preferred by most of the
agents.
Consensus is directly related to common knowledge. Agreement on a decision
implies common knowledge, and this becomes a prerequisite when a group of agents
try to make decisions together [12, 20]. Common knowledge occurs when all agents
know an item of information and also know that the other agents in the group know
that information [16].
Several methods for group decision making have been proposed in the litera-
ture [15, 24], including majority voting, auctions, Borda, Condorcet, and judgment
aggregations, among others. These methods do not assume a dialogue between the
group members, and each participant only votes on or gives a preference relation for
the set of possible alternatives, expressing neither the reasons for these votes nor the
conditions for opinion formation. Thus, dialogue becomes an important step before
voting, in which all participants can express their opinions and arguments, defend-
ing or attacking the alternatives or the information in other arguments presented
by other participants. Furthermore, through this dialogue, agents can change their
way of thinking based on the arguments presented.
The use of argumentation in multi-agent systems has received a great deal of
attention in the last decade. Building arguments allows the agents to reach a collec-
tive agreement that is consistent with their beliefs and goals [6, 22]. For a collective
decision to be close to unanimity, we need to identify the consensus level of the
group on the information in the arguments sent during the dialogue, analysing both
the supporting and rejecting relations in each element of the inner structure of those
arguments. The information in an argument that is supported (or accepted) by most
agents should be consented to by the other agents in the group who do not know it
or who reject it. Thus, the supported information becomes consensually accepted
by the group in relation to the issue under discussion.
In this paper, we propose a model of dialogue that uses arguments in the mes-
sages sent by the agents. Through the information in these arguments, common
knowledge is formed based on the majority knowledge of the group. The innova-
tions and contributions of this work are as follows:
1. development of a process of common knowledge identification;
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2. identification of the relation between common knowledge and consensus; and
3. development of semantics for consensus decision making.
Thus, the paper has two goals:
1. To present a dialogue model that can be applied to multi-agent systems, where
each argument presented needs to be evaluated by the group in an attempt
to identify the consensus level on each piece of information presented in the
arguments. As a result of this model, common knowledge is formed about the
set of information that was accepted or rejected by the group of agents. This
common knowledge formation can be used in several application domains where
multi-agent systems are used, such as chatbots, sensor networks, ranking of the
importance of web pages, identification of simultaneous actions, or any domain
in which there is a need for the formation of group opinion.
2. To generate a weighted argumentation graph [2, 5] for each dialogue, so that
the decision alternatives can be analysed based on the arguments presented,
resulting in a preference relation for the group. The preference relation draws
on computation of the strength of an argument, and uses a semantics that
considers all the weights of the arguments to determine the preference level
for each alternative.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the preliminary concepts
of possible worlds, common knowledge and structured arguments. Section 3 de-
scribes the proposed model of dialogue, covering the structures of the agents, the
construction of arguments, the formation of common knowledge, and the consensus
decision-making process, including the argument strength, the weighted argumenta-
tion graph and semantics for determining the preference relation among the decision
alternatives. A practical example, a discussion of the results, and related work are
given in Section 4. Finally, we present the conclusions and an outline of planned
future work in Section 5.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the fundamental background of knowledge representa-
tion related to possible worlds and common knowledge, which we use to represent
the possible decision alternatives (or issues) that are the subject of dialogue among
a group of agents. We also describe the fundamental concepts of arguments and
attack relations between arguments, which form the basic structure used by the
agents to send messages to the group during the dialogue.
The model proposed in this work considers a virtual environment where each
agent in a group, each one with its own knowledge base, is able to act sending
messages to the group in a discussion (dialogue) about any issue using logically
structured arguments. We model a dynamic process of dialogue that can be used by
the agents for choosing the alternative that is consensually justified or for obtaining
the order of preference over the available decision alternatives.
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2.1 Possible Worlds and Knowledge Representation
The classical model of reasoning about knowledge, as used by a single agent, is
known as the possible world model [17]. Possible worlds represent a possible state
of affairs (that is, there may be situations in which a belief holds for one issue under
discussion, but does not hold for another issue) [12]. Let AG = {ag1, . . . , agn} with
n > 0 be a finite set of agents. An agent ag i ∈ AG believes f if f is necessarily
true for ag i, i.e. it is true in all possible worlds for that agent. The modal operator
Ki represents the knowledge of agent ag i. The formula K1f is read as “agent ag1
knows f”, K1K2f is read as “agent ag1 knows that ag2 knows f” and ¬K2K1K3f
is read as “agent ag2 does not know that ag1 knows that ag3 knows f”.
When the reasoning involves the knowledge of a set of agents, two modal oper-
ators can be defined [13]: EAG (where EAGf represents the situation in which every
agent in the group knows f) and CAG (where CAGf represents the situation in which
every agent in the group knows f and they all know that every agent in the group
knows f , i.e. f is common knowledge in the group).
2.2 Structured Logical Arguments
The basis of the proposed dialogue model is the exchange of arguments among
agents. When an agent sends a message to the group containing an argument,
this argument represents the agent’s opinion of, point of view on or justification
for the issue under discussion. In this paper, Σ is a knowledge base with formulae
(beliefs) in a propositional language, and the arguments are built based on these
formulae [4]. In addition, ` is the classical inference, ≡ represents logical equivalence,
⊥ represents contradiction, ∧ conjunction, ∨ disjunction, ¬ negation,→ implication,
and ↔ biconditionality. An argument [3, 4, 21] is formed by a pair 〈Φ, α〉 where
Φ represents the support (premises) and α the claim of the argument, such that
1. α is a formula;
2. Φ ⊆ Σ;
3. Φ 0⊥;
4. Φ ` α; and
5. @Φ′ ⊆ Φ such that Φ′ ` α.
Arguments are created to justify a position against the decision alternative or
other arguments. The most common attack relations between arguments are under-
cut and rebuttal [4, 21]. Let arg1 = 〈Φ1, α1〉 and arg2 = 〈Φ2, α2〉 be two distinct
arguments: arg1 undercuts arg2 iff ∃ϕ ∈ Φ2 such that α1 ≡ ¬ϕ, and arg1 rebuts
arg2 iff α1 ≡ ¬α2.
Example 1. Let Σ = {a,¬b, a → ¬b, d → b, a → d} be a knowledge base of an
agent. Let us consider the following three arguments arg1 = 〈{a, a → ¬b},¬b〉,
arg2 = 〈{¬b, d → b, a → d},¬a〉, and arg3 = 〈{a, a → d, d → b}, b〉. We have that
arg2 undercuts arg1 and arg3 rebuts arg1. Figure 1 illustrates these attack relations.
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Figure 1. Types of attack relation: undercut (u) and rebuttal (r)
3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENSUS DECISION MAKING
The proposed dialogue model using arguments for common knowledge formation is
constructed using agents that play two roles: argumentation and mediation. Ar-
gumentative agents are responsible for building arguments and voting, using the
beliefs in their respective knowledge bases. Each belief consists of a formula in
propositional language. Argumentative agents are also responsible for giving their
opinions by voting to support or reject the formulae in arguments sent by the other
argumentative agents during the dialogue. The mediator agent is responsible for
several other aspects: controlling the message exchange among the argumentative
agents, that is, controlling the course of the dialogue; calculating the consensus level
on each formula within an argument; informing the group of argumentative agents
of which formulae should be accepted during the dialogue; computing the strength
of each argument; and informing the group of the outcome of the decision.
For the argumentative and mediator agents, we define a model for common
knowledge formation (CKF ).
Definition 1. A model for common knowledge formation is a tuple CKF = 〈AG,
EX, ISS ,med , t, σ〉 where:
• AG = {ag1, . . . , agn} with n > 1 is the finite set of argumentative agents;
• EX = {ex1, . . . , exn} with exi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑n
i=1 exi = 1 is the set of expertise
values for the argumentative agents, such that ag i has expertise exi;
• ISS = {iss1, . . . , issm} with m > 1 is the finite set of issues (or decision alter-
natives) to be discussed;
• med is the mediator agent;
• t is the waiting time used by the mediator to coordinate the message exchange;
and
• σ is a threshold value determining when a formula is common knowledge.
3.1 Argumentative Agent
Argumentative agents are responsible for building arguments, and for supporting or
rejecting any information used in an argument.
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Definition 2. Let AG be the set of argumentative agents. An argumentative agent
ag i ∈ AG is a tuple 〈Σi, Si, Ai〉, where:
• Σi = Ki ∪ KOi is the knowledge base, with Ki representing the beliefs that
the agent has about the environment, and KOi representing the beliefs acquired
through communication with other agents;
• Si is the argument base, which is used to store the set of arguments to be sent
to the group; and
• Ai is the current argument that is being discussed by the group, which is used
to look for counterarguments.
A formula f ∈ Σi may be followed by a label, such as f [iss i(b), . . .] where
iss i ∈ ISS is an issue and b ∈ [0, 1] is the group consensus level on f related to the
issue iss i. Whenever b > 0, most of the agents in AG believe f , and this formula is
accepted as common knowledge. For b = 0, formula f is not accepted by the group
as common knowledge since it is rejected or because most agents do not know f .
Example 2. [adapted from [3]] Consider a set of argumentative agents AG decid-
ing whether or not a patient should undergo surgery. Let Bob, agbob ∈ AG, be
an argumentative agent representing a doctor. The formulae in the knowledge base
represent the following information: the patient should undergo a surgery (sg), the
patient has colonic polyps (a), the patient is at risk of loss of life (b), the patient is
experiencing side-effects (c), the patient has cancer (d). Its structure is defined by:
Kbob = {a[sg(1)],¬c→ ¬sg[sg(0)], c→ sg, d→ b, a→ d, d ∧ ¬b→ sg},
KObob = {¬b[sg(0.7)],¬c[sg(0.4)]},
Sbob = {〈{¬c,¬c→ ¬sg},¬sg〉, 〈{a, a→ d, d→ b}, b〉},
Abob = {〈{a, a→ ¬b},¬b〉}.
The formulae ¬b and ¬c were accepted by the group, and therefore, were considered
by agbob and used to update its KObob base. Formula a was accepted unanimously,
while ¬c → ¬sg was not accepted by the group in the dialogue about sg. When
agbob has the opportunity to send arguments, both arguments in Sbob will be sent to
the group. Abob stores the current argument in the discussion, and this is used as
a reference to look for other counterarguments, storing them in Sbob when requested.
Let ARG i be the set of all arguments that can be built from Σi and arg ∈ ARG i
be an argument with arg = 〈Φ, α〉. The function premise(arg) returns Φ (a set of
formulae in support of arg) and claim(arg) returns α (the formula in the claim of
arg). Let F be the set of all formulae in arg obtained from the function split(arg)
(premise(arg) ∪ claim(arg)). Each formula f ∈ F has a set of atoms obtained from
the function atoms(f). These functions are used by the argumentative agents to
express support for or rejection of each formula in the argument that is presented
to the group in the dialogue.
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A formula f in any argument is supported by an argumentative agent when
it knows that formula. The argumentative agent rejects f when it knows other
formulae with the same atoms, but with no equivalent meaning.
Definition 3. A formula f in an argument arg1 sent by an agent ag i is supported
by ag j, with i 6= j, iff (i) ∃arg2 ∈ ARG j|claim(arg2) ↔ f is a tautology or (ii)
∃g ∈ Σj|atoms(g) = atoms(f) and µ ↔ f is a tautology. Formula f is rejected
iff (i) ∃arg2 ∈ ARG j|claim(arg2) ↔ ¬f is a tautology or (ii) ∃g ∈ Σj|atoms(g) =
atoms(f) and g ↔ f is not a tautology.
From Definition 3, we can observe that the agent ag j supports a formula f of
an argument sent by ag i if ag j has an argument for f (i.e. 〈{Φ}, f〉 ∈ ARG j), or if
ag j knows f (i.e. f ∈ Σj). A rejection occurs when ag j has an argument for ¬f (i.e.
〈{Φ},¬f〉 ∈ ARG j), or if ag j knows a formula g that has the same atoms as f , but
g and f are not logically equivalent.
Example 3. [cont. 2] Consider arg = 〈{a, a → ¬d},¬d〉, which will be analyzed
to identify the consensus level on its formulae. Agent agbob supports a because it
believes this formula. Formula a → ¬d is rejected because agbob believes a → d
and (a → ¬d) ↔ (a → d) is not a tautology. Formula ¬d is supported by agbob
because it has an argument for ¬d: 〈{¬b, d → b},¬d〉 and rejected with argument
〈{a, a→ d}, d〉.
The possible actions available to all the argumentative agents ag i ∈ AG in
an argumentative dialogue for a decision by consensus are as follows:
• discArg(arg , y): the current argument arg presented in the dialogue is stored
in Ai of the argumentative agents along with a number y that denotes its position
in the sequence in which the argument was sent to the group;
• askSpeak(): when Si 6= ∅, ag i informs med that it has some arguments to be
sent;
• propose(): when ag i is requested to send its arguments, it sends all the arguments
in Si to med and then Si is emptied;
• attack(t): ag i looks for arguments attacking the argument in Ai, storing them
in Si, in time t;
• voteSupport(f, t): ag i votes to support formula f at time t;
• voteRejection(f, t): ag i votes to reject formula f at time t;
• learn(f, b, iss): ag i updates Σi with formula f and the label containing the
consensus level b for issue iss. If f ∈ Σi, then the action inform(f, b, iss) is
executed; otherwise, formula f [iss(b)] should be inserted in KOi;
• inform(f, b, iss): agents with f ∈ Σi should update f with the label f [iss(b)]
only when issue iss is not yet annotated in f ;
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• query(ag j, at): agent ag i can ask ag j with i 6= j for formulae containing the
atom at. This action does not involve the med agent and can be performed at
any time by the argumentative agents;
• answer(ag i, F ): when an agent ag j is queried, it replies to ag i, returning the set
of formulae F containing the atom at.
3.2 Mediator Agent
There is a dialogue for each decision alternative and the mediator agent maintains
a dialogue table for each dialogue. This table is used to store the sequence of argu-
ments received during the dialogue, the attacks on the arguments and information
about the consensus regarding each argument.
Definition 4. The mediator agent med is a tuple 〈WB ,AGENDA,DT , δ〉, where:
• WB is an ordered list of argumentative agents;
• AGENDA is a list that stores all the arguments sent by one agent when re-
quested;
• DT = {dt1, . . . , dtm} is the set of dialogue tables where each dti ∈ DT has the
arguments sent during the dialogue on the issue issi;
• δ is the knowledge base that stores all the formulae of the arguments within
a dialogue, with their respective annotations.
WB is used by med as a coordination resource that emulates a face-to-face
meeting. When an argumentative agent has arguments to send to the group, it asks
to speak (action askSpeak()) to med and waits for a request to send the arguments.
This resource ensures that only agents in WB are granted the right to speak. Only
the agent at the top of the list at any given moment is able to send its arguments
when requested.
When med requests the arguments of an argumentative agent, all the arguments
received (action propose()) are stored in AGENDA. Each argument needs to be
checked; that is, med checks whether the arguments are admitted and whether an
argument has already been presented in the current dialogue.
Definition 5. An argument is admitted iff its formulae in Φ are accepted for the
current dialogue. A formula f is accepted for the issue issi if it does not mention
another issue: ∀atom(f) /∈ ISS \ {iss i}. Furthermore, it must satisfy one of the
following conditions:
1. it has not been presented in any other arguments in the current dialogue (formula
without a label for iss i); or
2. there is a consensus on it (label iss i(b) with b > 0).
Example 4. [cont. 2] In a dialogue about sg, the argument 〈{a[sg(1)], a→ d}, d〉 is
admitted. There is consensus on a, and a→ d has not been presented earlier in any
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argument about the issue sg. On the other hand, the argument 〈{¬c[sg(0.4)],¬c→
¬sg[sg(0)]},¬sg〉 is not admitted. Although there is consensus on ¬c, there is no
consensus on ¬c→ ¬sg.
Each admitted argument within the AGENDA occupies a row in the current
dialogue table. The dialogue table has the following fields: y (a sequential number
indicating the sequence in which the arguments are presented), the issuer agent,
the admitted argument, the argument being attacked, the sets of supporting and
rejecting agents for each formula of the argument, the set of consensus levels for
each formula of the argument, and the intrinsic strength of the argument.
After the support and rejection steps (actions voteSupport and voteRejection),
agent med computes the consensus level of f and stores it with the corresponding
label in δ, informing the group of argumentative agents of whether or not f should
be accepted as common knowledge.
Algorithm 1 shows the dialogue model for CKF executed by med . Firstly, the
structure for a new dialogue is created (line 2, function newDialogue(iss)) involving
the creation of WB , AGENDA, and the start point for the dialogue arg = 〈{T}, iss〉
is returned (a structure with only the claim to be discussed). The dialogue ta-
ble for the issue iss is initialized and the current line in the table is returned by
updateDT (med , arg) (line 3). Then, med sends arg to the group (line 4) and asks
for support and rejection of formula iss at time t (lines 5–6). The dialogue table is
updated, including the list of agents that supported and rejected formula iss, the
consensus level and the intrinsic strength for the start point (lines 7–8, functions
buf(iss) and is(arg)). The argumentative agents look for counterarguments at time t
(line 9). When med requests agents with arguments to send, the responses are stored
in agents (line 10) and WB is updated (line 11, function updateWB(agents)). For
each agent in WB , the agent in the first position of the queue sends its arguments
(line 13, function requestArgs(ag i)), and all arguments received are stored in the
AGENDA (line 14, function updateAGENDA(argsList)). Each argument is checked
(line 16, function check(argk)). Only the admitted arguments are stored in dt for
the current dialogue (line 17), and the group is informed (line 18). Each formula
of the argument undergoes a voting process considering a time t (lines 20–21) and
receives a consensus level (line 22); the current dialogue table is updated with the
agreement and rejection lists and the consensus level for the formula under analysis
(line 23); the knowledge base of med is updated with the formula and its related
label (line 24); med informs the group of whether or not the formula should be ac-
cepted (lines 25–28); the intrinsic strength is updated in the dialogue table (line 29);
and med asks the group to look for counterarguments, waiting a time t before asking
which agents have arguments to send (lines 30–32). The current dialogue ends when
WB and AGENDA are empty.
The buf (f) function acts as a belief update function. It is responsible for com-
puting the consensus level of the group on formula f in an argument, determining
which formulae should be accepted as common knowledge. Equation (1) shows how
this function is obtained. We refer to exi as the expertise value of the agent that
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Algorithm 1 Dialogue model for common knowledge formation
Input: the issue to be discussed (decision alternative)
Output: the dialogue table for the issue
1: procedure Dialogue(iss)
2: arg ← newDialogue(iss)
3: y ← updateDT (med , arg)
4: action(discArg(arg , y))
5: support ← action(voteSupport(iss , t))
6: reject ← action(voteRejection(iss , t))
7: b← buf (iss)
8: updateDT (y, iss , support , reject , b, is(arg))
9: action(attack(t))
10: agents ← action(askSpeak())
11: updateWB(agents)
12: for all ag i ∈WB do
13: argsList ← requestArgs(ag i)
14: updateAGENDA(argsList)
15: for all argk ∈ AGENDA do
16: if check(argk) then
17: y ← updateDT (ag i, argk)
18: action(discArg(argk, y))
19: for all f ∈ argk do
20: support ← action(voteSupport(f, t))
21: reject ← action(voteRejection(f, t))
22: b← buf (f)
23: updateDT (y, f, support , reject , b)
24: if b ≥ σ then
25: action(learn(f, b, iss))
26: else
27: action(inform(f, 0, iss))
28: updateDT (y, is(argk))
29: action(attack(t))
30: agents ← action(askSpeak())
31: updateWB(agents)
sent the current argument, and Support [f ] and Reject [f ] as the set of agents that
voted to support or reject formula f , respectively.







With buf (f) representing the consensus level on f , issk ∈ ISS the issue under
discussion, and ag i ∈ AG an argumentative agent:
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• buf (f) ≥ σ: formula f [issk(buf (f))] should be accepted and considered common
knowledge;
• buf (f) < σ: formula f [issk(0)] should be updated only when f ∈ Σi.
3.3 Consensus Decision Making
Each dialogue table contains a finite set of arguments ARG = {arg1, . . . , argz} with
z > 0 related to an issue. This set is then mapped to an abstract argumentation
framework such as the one proposed by Dung [11], formed of a pair AF = 〈ARG , R〉
where ARG is the set of arguments and R is a binary relation representing attacks
between arguments with R ⊆ ARG × ARG . The notation R(arg i, arg j) repre-
sents the situation in which arg i attacks arg j. During the mapping, an undercut
is a single attack relation from the attacking to the attacked (i.e. R(arg i, arg j)),
while a rebuttal is a symmetric relation (i.e. R(arg i, arg j) and R(arg j, arg i)). The
abstract argumentation framework is represented as a graph in which the arguments
are nodes and the attack relations are edges. During mapping, each line of the dia-
logue table represents an argument (column arg). The attack relation (column att)
is used to link arguments. Other attacks between arguments can exist and these
additional edges need to be identified.
The starting point arg1 in the dialogue table is the main node in an argumenta-
tion graph representing the decision alternative. This node is special since it receives
only an undercut representing the arguments against the decision alternative. We
refer to ARGS = ARG \{arg1} as the set of all arguments removing the main node.
The consensus decision-making process uses two additional phases to find the de-
cision alternative that is most preferred by the group: computation of the strength of
the arguments and determination of the extent to which one alternative is preferred
to another.
3.3.1 Computing Argument Strength
Arguments have two types of strength: intrinsic and overall strength [8]. The in-
trinsic strength is a value obtained using the concept of group majority knowledge,
which expresses the extent to which an argument is reliable based on its formulae.
This type of strength considers the supporting and rejecting votes in each formula
of the structured argument sent during the dialogue. The overall strength is a score
representing the importance of the arguments when compared to other arguments
in an argumentation graph. This type of strength considers the attack relations
between arguments in an abstract argumentation graph.
Equations (2) and (3) show how to compute the intrinsic and overall strengths,
respectively. Let length : ARG → N be a function that returns the number of
formulae of an argument arg i ∈ ARG and attack : ARG → ATT with ATT ⊆
ARG be a function that returns the set of arguments that attack arg i, that is,
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To solve the entire system of argumentation, we use an iterative method [10]
on the set ARGS . Let time0 be the initial overall strength calculation for each
argument, and times the overall strength calculation obtained after the s
th iteration.
An iteration at times computes a new overall strength at times+1 for all arguments
in ARGS . We refer to os(arg i)
s as the process of computing the overall strength
of arg i in iteration s. The iteration terminates when os(arg i)
s = os(arg i)
s+1 for all
arguments. The result is independent of the processing order of the arguments.
3.3.2 Computing Preference Relations
To determine the preference relations among the decision alternatives, we propose
an adaptation to the argument labelling in which the arguments receive a label of
“in”, “out” or “undec” according to their iterations with other arguments in the
argumentation graph [7]. These labels are used to specify the arguments that are
accepted (in) or rejected (out), and those that are neither accepted nor rejected
(undec) [23].
In this adaptation, the labelling implies that arguments with greater overall
strengths (labelled as “in”) are acceptable (or partially acceptable) and undermine
those arguments with lower overall strengths (labelled as “out”) that are attacked
by them. Arguments labelled as “undec” are those with identical overall strengths.
In this case, we use the intrinsic strength that represents the consensus level to
determine the argument most preferred by the group (“in” or “out”). The arguments
are designated as “undec” only when both the overall and intrinsic strengths are the
same and there is no attacking argument labelled “in”.
We define the following functions to obtain the neighbours of an argument
arg i ∈ ARGS : getAllNeighbors : ARGS → NB where NB is the set of all neigh-
bours of arg i (we consider neighbours to be the attackers and attacked arguments
with NB = {argb ∈ ARGS |R(argb, arg i) ∪ R(arg i, argb)}); getLabeledNeighbors :
NB → LNB where LNB is the set of neighbours with an associated label (“in”,
“out”, or “undec”); and ACC : AF → INARGS is the set of acceptable argu-
ments of an argumentation graph with the label “in”. The argument labelling
is a function that assigns a label to each argument in the graph. Argument la-
belling uses two sets P and Q representing the set of all labelled neighbours with
maximum overall strength and the set of all labelled neighbours with equal over-
all strength, respectively, where P = {arg j ∈ LNB|os(arg j) > os(arg i)} and
Q = {arg j ∈ LNB|os(arg j) = os(arg i)}.
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Definition 6. Let arg i ∈ ARGS be an argument and P and Q be the sets of
labelled neighbours with maximum and equal overall strengths, respectively. An ar-
gument labelling for an argumentation graph is a total function L : ARGS →
{in, out, undec} such that:
1. if P = ∅ and Q = ∅, then L(arg i) = in;
2. if P = ∅ and (∃arg j ∈ Q)(is(arg i) = is(arg j)), then L(arg i) = undec;
3. if P = ∅ and (∃arg j ∈ Q)(is(arg i) > is(arg j)), then L(arg i) = in;
4. if P = ∅ and (∃arg j ∈ Q)(is(arg i) < is(arg j)), then L(arg i) = out;
5. if (∃arg j ∈ P )(L(arg j) = in) , then L(arg i) = out;
6. if (∀arg j ∈ P )(L(arg j) ∈ {out, undec}), then L(arg i) = in.
The labelling of all arguments uses an iterative method to calculate the overall
strength of the arguments, since the arguments have links between them and when
an argument is labelled, its attacks and attackers need to be reviewed. We refer
to L(arg i)
w as the process of labelling argument arg i in an iteration w. The last
iteration occurs when L(arg i)
w = L(arg i)
w+1 for all arguments in ARGS .
Let POS : ARGS → {−1, 1} be a function that returns 1 if arg i is a supporting
argument, and −1 otherwise. Supporting arguments are those with even distance
over a simple shorter path to the main node in the argumentation graph, while
rejecting arguments are those with odd distance over a simple shorter path to the
main node in the argumentation graph. To compute the preference level for the
decision alternative iss, we need to compute the position of the accepted arguments
according to Equation (4). The preferred order relation of two decision alternatives
is denoted by the symbols  and ∼ (preferred or equally preferred, respectively).
Whenever pref (iss1) > pref (iss2) we have iss1  iss2; for pref (iss1) < pref (iss2) we
have iss2  iss1; and for pref (iss1) = pref (iss2) we have iss1 ∼ iss2. In this case,
the choice of the preferred decision alternative is random. In the special case when
there is no argument in the dialogue, that is, if ARGS = ∅, then the preference level




POS (argy) ∗ os(argy). (4)
Example 5. Consider the argumentation graph and the iterations for labelling in
Figure 2. We have L(arg2) = out , L(arg3) = in, L(arg4) = in, L(arg5) = out ,
ACC = {arg3, arg4}, POS (arg3) = −1, and POS (arg4) = 1. The preference level
for the issue is pref (iss i) = 0.13
4 PRACTICAL EXAMPLE
Our example consists of a discussion among three agents that are trying to decide
whether a robot should rescue a human being in a disaster situation. The robot has
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Figure 2. Labelling of arguments for issue iss i. The double line represents the main node.
a stretcher that can carry only one person at a time. There are two possible decision
alternatives for the robot: recharge its battery, x, or rescue the individual and take
him/her to the hospital, y. Let CKF = 〈{ag1, ag2, ag3}, {0.4, 0.3, 0.3}, {x, y},med ,
10, 0.4〉 and the atoms in the formulae represent the sentences: a = the battery has
less than 70 % charge; b = the person is very far from the robot; c = the risk of
death is 9 ([0, 10] where 10 means the person is dead); and d = the person is alive.
The initial knowledge is:
ag1 = {{a, b,¬c, c→ d, a ∧ b→ x, a ∧ b→ ¬y}, {}},
ag2 = {{a,¬b, c, c→ d, a ∧ b→ x, a ∧ b→ y, a ∧ b→ ¬d}, {}},
ag3 = {{b, c, c→ d, d→ ¬x, a ∧ b→ x, a ∧ b→ ¬y, d→ y}, {}}.
Agent med creates the starting point arg1 = 〈{T}, x〉 and informs the group
(arg1 is stored in the Ai base of all argumentative agents). For voting, we have
Support [x] = {ag1} where ag1 has the argument 〈{a, b, a∧ b→ x}, x〉 supporting it,
and Reject [x] = {ag3} where ag3 has the argument 〈{c, c → d, d → ¬x},¬x〉, with
buf(x) = 0.1. Agent ag3 has S3 = {〈{c, c→ d, d→ ¬x},¬x〉} and sends this to med
when requested. After being checked by the mediator, this argument is inserted into
the dtx as arg2. Thus, for voting, we have Support [c] = {ag2}, Reject [c] = {ag1},
Support [c → d] = {ag1, ag2}, Reject [¬x] = {ag1}, buf (c) = 0.2, buf (c → d) = 1,
buf (d → ¬x) = 0.3, and buf (¬x) = −0.1. The group is informed of all formulae
and these are updated with the corresponding label.
Agent ag1 has two arguments arg3 and arg4 in S1 = {〈{¬c},¬c〉, 〈{a, b, a ∧
b → x}, x〉}. When requested, ag1 sends the arguments, med checks them and
informs the group. For voting, we have: Reject[¬c] = {ag2, ag3} with buf(¬c) =
−0.2 (agents ag2 and ag3 have the counterargument 〈{c}, c〉 but formula c[x(0)] was
presented in a previous argument and was not accepted, meaning that this argument
is not admitted); Support [a] = {ag2} and Reject [a] = {ag3} with buf (a) = 0.4,
Support [b] = {ag3} and Reject [b] = {ag2} with buf (b) = 0.4, Support [a ∧ b → x] =
{ag2, ag3} with buf (a∧b→ x) = 1 (all agents know this formula), Reject [x] = {ag3}
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with buf (x) = 0.1. Formulae a[x(0.4)], b[x(0.4)], and a ∧ b → x[x(1)] are then
accepted by the group, becoming common knowledge.
Agent ag2 has the argument arg5 = 〈{¬b},¬b〉 in S2 with Support [¬b] = {ag3},
Reject [¬b] = {ag1, ag3} and buf (¬b) = −0.1. Agent ag3 has the argument 〈{b}, b〉
with Support [b] = {ag1, ag2}, Reject [b] = {ag2} and buf (b) = 0.7. Since WB and
AGENDA are empty, the dialogue for x is complete. It is important to note that
the argumentative agents have other counterarguments during the dialogue, but
these are not admitted. Agent med starts the dialogue again for the next decision
alternative. After all dialogues, the knowledge of the agents is:
ag1 = {{a[x(0.4), y(0.4)], b[x(0.4), y(0.4)],¬c[x(0), y(0.7)], c→ d[x(1), y(1)],
a ∧ b→ x[x(1)], a ∧ b→ ¬y[y(0.4)]}, {}},
ag2 = {{a[x(0.4), y(0.4)],¬b[x(0), y(0)], c[x(0), y(0)], c→ d[x(1), y(1)],
a ∧ b→ x[x(1)], a ∧ b→ y[y(0)], a ∧ b→ ¬d[y(0)]}, {b[x(0.4), y(0.4)],
a ∧ b→ ¬y[y(0.4)],¬c[y(0.7)]}},
ag3 = {{b[x(0.4), y(0.4)], c[x(0), y(0)], c→ d[x(1), y(1)], d→ ¬x[x(0)],
a ∧ b→ x[x(1)], a ∧ b→ ¬y[y(0.4)], d→ y[y(0)]}, {a[x(0.4), y(0.4)],
¬c[y(0.7)]}}.
Table 1 shows the dialogues for x and y. The corresponding argumentation
graphs are shown in Figure 3 with the arguments and their overall strengths. The
steps used in labelling the arguments are presented in Table 2. For a dialogue about
x, we have: L(arg2) = out , L(arg3) = in, L(arg4) = in, L(arg5) = out , L(arg6) =
in, ACC = {arg3, arg4, arg6}, POS (arg3) = 1, POS (arg4 = 1), POS (arg6) = 1
and pref (x) = 1.52. For a dialogue about y, we have: L(arg2) = in, L(arg3) =
out , L(arg4) = out , L(arg5) = out , L(arg6) = in, L(arg7) = in, L(arg8) = in,
ACC = {arg2, arg6, arg7, arg8}, POS (arg2) = −1, POS (arg6) = −1, POS (arg7) =
−1, POS (arg8) = −1, and pref (y) = −1.83. As a result of this dialogue, we have
x  y, where x is the preferred decision alternative for the group.
4.1 Results and Discussion
From the practical example given above, it is possible to observe the relation be-
tween common knowledge and consensus about information that is accepted by the
group of agents. In this work, we refer to each decision alternative as a possi-
ble world. One approach to formalising these possible worlds is the Kripke struc-
ture [12]. A Kripke Structure KS for n agents over a set of primitive proposi-
tions Γ is a tuple (P, π,Θ1, . . . ,Θn) where P is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
π : (p) → {true, false} is a function that assigns a truth value to the propositions
in Γ for each possible world p ∈ P ; and Θi is a binary accessibility relation between
the possible worlds in P . We can represent the practical example in a Kripke Struc-
ture using the system S5 [12, 14, 18] for knowledge representation in each agent
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Table 1. Arguments, supporting and rejecting votes and intrinsic strengths for x and y
Table 2. Labelling arguments from dtx and dty
where the possible worlds are symmetric, transitive and reflexive. Let the sequence
[x, y] represent the decision alternatives, with values T for true and F for false.
Before the dialogue, agent ag1 has one argument asserting x (〈{a, b, a ∧ b →
x}, x〉) and one argument asserting ¬y (〈{a, b, a ∧ b → ¬y},¬y〉). For this agent,
there is only one possible world: w1 = [T, F ]. Agent ag2 does not have an argument
for either x or y. In this case, both decision alternatives are accepted with four
possible worlds: w1 = [T, F ], w2 = [F, T ], w3 = [T, T ], w4 = [F, F ]. Agent ag3 has
one argument for ¬x (〈{c, c → d, d → ¬x},¬x〉) and one for y (〈{c, c → d, d →
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a) b)
Figure 3. Argumentation graphs mapped from a) dtx and b) dty. Double lines represent
the main node, and dotted lines are additional attack relations detected in the mapping.
y}, y〉) with only one possible world: w2[F, T ]. In this case, there is no consensus
on x or y, as shown in Figure 4 a).
After the dialogue, ag1, ag2 and ag3 accept only world w1 = [T, F ] (argu-
ments: 〈{a, b, a ∧ b → x}, x〉 and 〈{a, b, a ∧ b → ¬y},¬y〉). Agent ag2 still has
an argument for y (〈{a, b, a ∧ b → y}, y〉) and ag3 has arguments for ¬x and y
(〈{c, c → d, d → ¬x},¬x〉 and 〈{c, c → d, d → y}, y〉), but these arguments are
not admitted and therefore do not establish a position against ¬x or in favour of y.
After the dialogue, we can observe that there is a consensus on world w1 = [T, F ],
as shown in Figure 4 b).
Figure 4. Possible worlds and consensus for agents ag1, ag2, and ag3: a) before the dia-
logue; and b) after the dialogue, with common knowledge formation
We can also use the modal operators K, E, and C to represent the knowledge
of the agents:
• Kiϕ is equivalent to ϕ ∈ Σi (e.g. K1¬c implies that ¬c ∈ Σ1). If an agent knows
a piece of information, that information is in the agent’s knowledge base or can
be inferred.
• ¬KiKjϕ (e.g. K2d and ¬K1d or ¬K1K2d). If an agent does not know about
a piece of information, it can query other agents.
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• Kiϕ implies that KiKiϕ. If an information is in the agent’s knowledge base, the
agent knows that information and can use it to build new arguments and vote.
• ¬Kiϕ implies that Ki¬Kiϕ. The unknown information cannot be used to build
new arguments and vote.
• EAGϕ is equivalent to ∀ag i ∈ AG : ϕ ∈ Σi. Before the dialogue in the practical
example, agents know c→ d.
• CAGϕ is equivalent to ∀Σi,∃ϕ : ϕ[iss(b)] for iss ∈ ISS and b > 0. A formula is
common knowledge when related to an issue if it has a label with a consensus
level greater than zero.
Other characteristics of the model are as follows:
• It is able to represent the different belief states for each formula. Formulae ϕ
and ¬ϕ may be accepted at the same time for the same issue. The agent may
not have a well-defined position for that information.
• There are two ways in which an agent can decrease the strength of an argument:
voting for rejection of its formulae or sending counterarguments.
• Maximal acceptance of an argument arg results in is(arg) = 1, while maximal
rejection of the argument results in is(arg) = exi (the expertise value of the
proponent).
• A small number of strong attacks may be equivalent to or more rigorous than
several weak attacks.
4.2 Related Works
Dung [11] proposed some semantics to determine the admissibility of the argu-
ments, that is, a formal framework to identify conflict outcomes, such as preferred
or grounded semantics. The idea is to specify sets of acceptable arguments or ex-
tensions. An extension is a set of arguments that can be accepted together. These
semantics are used to select arguments without considering support for or rejection
of a decision alternative or group decision.
Coste-Marquis et al. [9] used an argumentation graph with weights in the attack
relations, and applied Dung’s semantics in determining the last attacked or best
defended extensions. Our proposal deals with strengths in arguments represented
as numerical values, applied when a group of agents intends to select the preferred
alternative by considering the opinions of all the agents.
Da Costa Pereira et al. [10] use a belief revision based on argumentation that
assigns fuzzy labelling to each argument, permitting the agent to change its mind
without removing the previous information forever, and allowing for recovery if this
information turns out to be wrong. In our work, the evaluation is carried out based
on the set of formulae of the argument, all arguments are evaluated, and the agents
store all the information that is acceptable to every possible world in their knowledge
bases.
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The work closest to our approach is probably that of Leite and Martins [19], who
extend Dung’s framework by applying it to online debate systems, allowing people
to vote to support or reject arguments or to send arguments that are not logically
structured. They defined a semantics for application to online debating systems
(democracy, universality, etc.) and to rank the arguments from the strongest to the
weakest, suggesting a preference for the group, although not a definite one. In our
work, arguments are logically structured; they are sent by agents within a restricted
group; the strengths of the arguments use quantitative (votes) as well as qualitative
(attacks) values; there are different dialogues, one for each issue; and the framework
still creates the preference order of the possible decision alternatives as a result.
5 CONCLUSION
This work presents an argumentative dialogue model for CKF in a group of agents.
This model is generic, and can be applied to a discussion about any issue where there
is a need for group opinions. We use propositional logic to represent the information
in the knowledge bases, and to build arguments and a voting model for support and
rejection, although other logical languages may be used.
The model has four main characteristics:
1. it allows agents to take part in a dialogue by exchanging arguments through
attack relations, while supporting or rejecting the arguments by voting on their
formulae;
2. based on the expertise of the agents, we can evaluate the arguments in numerical
form, representing the extent to which each formula (or argument as a whole)
is accepted by the group of agents;
3. the results obtained after the dialogue allow for an approximation of opinions,
meaning that the group can apply the model in consensus decision-making prob-
lems; and
4. the model presents a direct relation between common knowledge and consensus.
When a piece of information is taken as common knowledge, there is a consensus of
the group accepting that information. The output of the model is not the optimal
decision, but rather the decision preferred by the group.
There are several possible ways to extend this work. Some of these future direc-
tions involve the application of the model to decision making in which blocking is
possible, and the use of a reputation system to assign expertise to the agents, where
each value is related to the type of information presented in the argument.
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